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Connected TV (CTV) has not only transformed the entertainment world, it has also created a vibrant new platform for digital advertising. However, as with any innovative space, there are challenges that arise, including the emergence of bad actors aiming to siphon money away from advertisers and publishers through fraudulent or invalid ad traffic. Invalid traffic is an evolving challenge that has the potential to affect the integrity and health of digital advertising on CTV. However, there are steps the industry can take to combat invalid traffic and foster a clean, trustworthy, and sustainable ecosystem.



Information sharing and following best practices
Every player across the digital advertising ecosystem has the opportunity to help reduce the risk of CTV ad fraud. It starts by spreading awareness across the industry and building a commitment among partners to share best practices for defending against invalid traffic. Greater transparency and communication are crucial to creating lasting solutions.


One key best practice is contributing to and using relevant industry standards. We encourage CTV inventory providers to follow the CTV/OTT Device & App Identification Guidelines and IFA Guidelines. These guidelines, both of which were developed by the IAB Tech Lab, foster greater transparency, which in turn reduces the risk of invalid traffic on CTV. More information and details about using these resources can be found in the following guide: Protecting your ad-supported CTV experiences.



Collaborating on standards and solutions
No single company or industry group can solve this challenge on their own, we need to work collaboratively to solve the problem. Fortunately, we’re already seeing constructive efforts in this direction with industry-wide standards.


For example, the broad implementation of the IAB Tech Lab’s app-ads.txt and its web counterpart, ads.txt, have brought greater transparency to the digital advertising supply chain and have helped combat ad fraud by allowing advertisers to verify the sellers from whom they buy inventory. In 2021, the IAB Tech Lab extended the app-ads.txt standard to CTV in order to better protect and support CTV advertisers. This update is the first of several industry-wide steps that have been taken to further protect CTV advertising. In early 2022, the IAB Tech Lab released the ads.cert 2.0 “protocol suite,” along with a proposal to utilize this new standard to secure server-side connections (including for server-side ad insertion). Ads.cert 2.0 will also power future industry standards focused on securing the supply chain and preventing misrepresentation.


In addition to these efforts, the Media Rating Council (MRC) also engaged with stakeholders to develop its Server-Side Ad Insertion and OTT (Over-the-Top) Guidance, which provides a consistent set of guidelines specific to CTV for organizations that seek MRC accreditation for invalid traffic detection and filtration. We’re also seeing key partners tackle this challenge through informal working groups. For example, we collaborated with various CTV and security partners across our industry on a solution that allows companies to ensure video ad requests are coming from a valid Roku device


But more work is needed. Players across the digital advertising ecosystem need to continue to build momentum through opportunities and initiatives that enable further collaboration on solutions.



Our ongoing investment in invalid traffic defenses
At Google, we’ve been defending our ad systems against invalid traffic for nearly two decades. By striking the right balance between automation and human expertise, we’ve developed a comprehensive set of measures to respond to threats like botnets, click farms, domain misrepresentation, and more. We’re now applying a similar approach to minimize the risk of CTV ad fraud, balancing innovation with tried-and-true technologies.


We’ve developed a machine learning platform built on TensorFlow, which has enabled us to expand the amount of inventory we can review and scale our defenses against invalid traffic to include additional surfaces, such as CTV. While machine learning has allowed us to better analyze ad traffic in new and diverse ways, we’ve also continued to leverage the work of research analysts and industry experts to ensure our automated enforcement systems are running effectively on CTV.


In addition to setting up new defenses for CTV, we’re also taking a more conservative approach with the CTV inventory we make available. This ensures that we aren’t exposing advertisers to unnecessary risk while CTV standards and best practices continue to evolve and mature, and while their adoption by the industry increases. 



Evolving and adapting
We know that bad actors continuously evolve and adapt their methods to evade detection and enforcement of our policies. The tactics behind invalid traffic and ad fraud will inevitably become more sophisticated with the growth of CTV. However, if the industry pulls together, we’ll be in a better position to not only address these new threats head on, but stay one step ahead of them while building a CTV advertising ecosystem that is safe and sustainable for everyone.

As Mobile World Congress approaches, we have the opportunity to have deep and meaningful conversations across the industry about the present and future of connected device security. Ahead of the event, we wanted to take a moment to recognize and share additional details on the notable progress being made to form harmonized connected device security standards and certification initiatives that provide users with better transparency about how their sensitive data is protected.

Supporting the GSMA Working Party for Mobile Device Security Transparency

We’re pleased to support and participate in the recently announced GSMA working party, which will develop a first-of-its-kind smartphone security certification program. The program will leverage the Consumer Mobile Device Protection Profile (CMD PP) specification released by ETSI, a European Standards Development Organization (SDO), and will provide a consistent way to evaluate smartphones for critical capabilities like encryption, security updates, biometrics, networking, trusted hardware, and more.

This initiative should help address a significant gap in the market for consumers and policy makers, who will greatly benefit from a new, central security resource. Most importantly, these certification programs will evaluate connected devices across industry-accepted criteria. Widely-used devices, including smartphones and tablets, which currently do not have a familiar security benchmark or system in place, will be listed with key information on device protection capabilities to bring more transparency to users.

We hope this industry-run certification program can also benefit users and support policy makers in their work as they address baseline requirements and harmonization of standards.As policy makers consider changes through regulation and legislation, such as the UK’s Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act (PSTI), and emerging regulation like the EU Cyber Security and Cyber Resilience Acts, we share the concerns that today we are not equipped with globally recognized standards that are critical to increased security across the ecosystem. We join governments in the call to come together to ensure that we can build workable, harmonized standards to protect the security of users and mobile infrastructure today and build the resilience needed to protect our future.

The Importance of Harmonized Standards for Connected Devices

Connected devices, not just smartphones, are increasingly becoming the primary touchpoint for the most important aspects of our personal lives. From controlling the temperature of your home, to tracking your latest workout – connected devices have become embedded in our day-to-day tasks and activities. As consumers increasingly entrust more of their lives to their connected devices, they’re right to question the security protections provided and demand more transparency from manufacturers.

After we participated in a recent White House Workshop on IoT security labeling, we shared more about our commitment to security and transparency by announcing the extension of device security assessments – which started with Pixel 3 and now includes Nest, and Fitbit hardware. We have and always will strive to ensure our newly released products comply with the most prevalent security baselines that are defined by industry-recognized standards organizations. We will also remain transparent about critical security features – like how long our devices will receive security updates and our collaboration with security researchers that help us identify and fix security issues to help keep users safe.

By participating in international standards and certification programs such as our work as a member of the Connectivity Standards Alliance (Alliance), we’re working to raise the bar for the industry and develop a consistent set of security requirements that users can rely on.


New Research Continues to Help Inform Our Efforts to Establish Strong Security Standards and Labeling Practices

Last year, the Alliance formed the Product Security Working Group (PSWG). Over the past nine months, the working group has been making terrific progress on its mission to build an industry-run certification program for IoT devices that aligns with existing and future regulatory requirements to reduce fragmentation and promote harmonization.

Today, the Alliance in partnership with independent research firm Omdia, published a comprehensive research report that outlines all of the currently published and emerging global IoT security regulations and the standards baselines they map to. This critical research enables PSWG to hone its focus and efforts on harmonizing between ETSI EN 303 645 and NIST IR 8425, as these two baseline security standards were found to underpin the vast majority of the regulations outlined in the research report.

The other notable area of the report highlighted the need for transparent security labeling for connected devices, which has also become a very important industry initiative. A large majority (77%) of consumers surveyed indicated a device label that explains the privacy and security practices of the manufacturer would be important or very important to their purchasing decision. Transparent security labeling is critical in helping consumers understand which devices meet specific security standards and requirements during evaluation. We recently provided our principles for IoT security labeling and will continue to be a key contributor to efforts around providing users with transparent device security labels.

Creating Strong Connected Device Security Standards Together

It’s been inspiring to see all of the progress that the Connectivity Standards Alliance, GSMA and the industry at large has made on security standards and labeling initiatives in such a short time. It’s even more exciting to see how much collaboration there has been between both industry and the public sector on these efforts. We look forward to continuing the conversation and coordinating on these important security initiatives with policymakers, industry partners, developers and public interest advocates to bring more security and transparency to connected device users.

It has been another incredible year for the Vulnerability Reward Programs (VRPs) at Google! Working with security researchers throughout 2022, we have been able to identify and fix over 2,900 security issues and continue to make our products more secure for our users around the world.

We are thrilled to see significant year-over-year growth for our VRPs, and have had yet another record-breaking year for our programs! In 2022 we awarded over $12 million in bounty rewards – with researchers donating over $230,000 to a charity of their choice.

As in past years, we are sharing our 2022 Year in Review statistics across all of our programs. We would like to give a special thank you to all of our dedicated researchers for their continued work with our programs - we look forward to more collaboration in the future!

Android and Devices

The Android VRP had an incredible record breaking year in 2022 with $4.8 million in rewards and the highest paid report in Google VRP history of $605,000!

In our continued effort to ensure the security of Google device users, we have expanded the scope of Android and Google Devices in our program and are now incentivizing vulnerability research in the latest versions of Google Nest and Fitbit! For more information on the latest program version and qualifying vulnerability reports, please visit our public rules page.

We are also excited to share that the invite-only Android Chipset Security Reward Program (ACSRP) - a private vulnerability reward program offered by Google in collaboration with manufacturers of Android chipsets - rewarded $486,000 in 2022 and received over 700 valid security reports.

We would like to give a special shoutout to some of our top researchers, whose continued hard work helps to keep Android safe and secure:

  • Submitting an impressive 200+ vulnerabilities to the Android VRP this year, Aman Pandey of Bugsmirror remains one of our program’s top researchers. Since submitting their first report in 2019, Aman has reported more than 500 vulnerabilities to the program. Their hard work helps ensure the safety of our users; a huge thank you for all of their hard work!
  • Zinuo Han of OPPO Amber Security Lab quickly rose through our program’s ranks, becoming one of our top researchers. In the last year they have identified 150 valid vulnerabilities in Android.
  • Finding yet another critical exploit chain, gzobqq submitted our highest valued exploit to date.
  • Yu-Cheng Lin (林禹成) (@AndroBugs) remains one of our top researchers submitting just under 100 reports this year.

Chrome

Chrome VRP had another unparalleled year, receiving 470 valid and unique security bug reports, resulting in a total of $4 million of VRP rewards. Of the $4M, $3.5 million was rewarded to researchers for 363 reports of security bugs in Chrome Browser and nearly $500,000 was rewarded for 110 reports of security bugs in ChromeOS.

This year, Chrome VRP re-evaluated and refactored the Chrome VRP reward amounts to increase the reward amounts for the most exploitable and harmful classes and types of security bugs, as well as added a new category for memory corruption bugs in highly privileged processes, such as the GPU and network process, to incentivize research in these critical areas. The Chrome VRP increased the fuzzer bonuses for reports from VRP-submitted fuzzers running on the Google ClusterFuzz infrastructure as part of the Chrome Fuzzing program. A new bisect bonus was introduced for bisections performed as part of the bug report submission, which helps the security team with our triage and bug reproduction.

2023 will be the year of experimentation in the Chrome VRP! Please keep a lookout for announcements of experiments and potential bonus opportunities for Chrome Browser and ChromeOS security bugs.

The entire Chrome team sincerely appreciates the contributions of all our researchers in 2022 who helped keep Chrome Browser, ChromeOS, and all the browsers and software based on Chromium secure for billions of users across the globe.

In addition to posting about our Top 0-22 Researchers in 2022, Chrome VRP would like to specifically acknowledge some specific researcher achievements made in 2022:

  • Rory McNamara, a six-year participant in Chrome VRP as a ChromeOS researcher, became the highest rewarded researcher of all time in the Chrome VRP. Most impressive is that Rory has achieved this in a total of only 40 security bug submissions, demonstrating just how impactful his findings have been - from ChromeOS persistent root command execution, resulting in a $75,000 reward back in 2018, to his many reports of root privilege escalation both with and without persistence. Rory was also kind enough to speak at the Chrome Security Summit in 2022 to share his experiences participating in the Chrome VRP over the years. Thank you, Rory!
  • SeongHwan Park (SeHwa), a participant in the Chrome VRP since mid-2021, has been an amazing contributor of ANGLE / GPU security bug reports in 2022 with 11 solid quality reports of GPU bugs earning them a spot on Chrome VRP 2022 top researchers list. Thank you, SeHwa!

Securing Open Source

Recognizing the fact that Google is one of the largest contributors and users of open source in the world, in August 2022 we launched OSS VRP to reward vulnerabilities in Google's open source projects - covering supply chain issues of our packages, and vulnerabilities that may occur in end products using our OSS. Since then, over 100 bughunters have participated in the program and were rewarded over $110,000.

Sharing Knowledge

We’re pleased to announce that in 2022, we’ve made the learning opportunities for bug hunters available at our Bug Hunter University (BHU) more diverse and accessible. In addition to our existing collections of articles, which support improving your reports and avoiding invalid reports, we’ve made more than 20 instructional videos available. Clocking in at around 10 minutes each, these videos cover the most relevant learning topics and trends we’ve observed over the past years.

To make this happen, we teamed up with some of your favorite and best-known security researchers from around the globe, including LiveOverflow, PwnFunction, stacksmashing, InsiderPhD, PinkDraconian, and many more!

If you’re tired of reading our articles, or simply curious and looking for an alternative way to expand your bug hunting skills, these videos are for you. Check out our overview, or hop right in to the BHU YouTube playlist. Happy watching & learning!


Google Play

2022 was a year of change for the Google Play Security Reward Program. In May we onboarded both new teammates and some old friends to triage and lead GPSRP. We also sponsored NahamCon ‘22, BountyCon in Singapore, and NahamCon Europe’s online event. In 2023 we hope to continue to grow the program with new bug hunters and partner on more events focused on Android & Google Play apps.

Research Grants

In 2022 we continued our Vulnerability Research Grant program with success. We’ve awarded more than $250,000 in grants to over 170 security researchers. Last year we also piloted collaboration double VRP rewards for selected grants and are looking forward to expanding it even more in 2023.

If you are a Google VRP researcher and want to be considered for a Vulnerability Research Grant, make sure you opted in on your bughunters profile.

Looking Forward

Without our incredible security researchers we wouldn’t be here sharing this amazing news today. Thank you again for your continued hard work!

Also, in case you haven’t seen Hacking Google yet, make sure to check out the “Bug Hunters” episode, featuring some of our very own super talented bug hunters.

Thank you again for helping to make Google, the Internet, and our users more safe and secure! Follow us on @GoogleVRP for other news and updates.

Thank you to Adam Bacchus, Dirk Göhmann, Eduardo Vela, Sarah Jacobus, Amy Ressler, Martin Straka, Jan Keller, Tony Mendez, Rishika Hooda, Medha Jain

A modern Android powered smartphone is a complex hardware device: Android OS runs on a multi-core CPU - also called an Application Processor (AP). And the AP is one of many such processors of a System On Chip (SoC). Other processors on the SoC perform various specialized tasks — such as security functions, image & video processing, and most importantly cellular communications. The processor performing cellular communications is often referred to as the baseband. For the purposes of this blog, we refer to the software that runs on all these other processors as “Firmware”.

Securing the Android Platform requires going beyond the confines of the Application Processor (AP). Android’s defense-in-depth strategy also applies to the firmware running on bare-metal environments in these microcontrollers, as they are a critical part of the attack surface of a device.

A popular attack vector within the security research community

As the security of the Android Platform has been steadily improved, some security researchers have shifted their focus towards other parts of the software stack, including firmware. Over the last decade there have been numerous publications, talks, Pwn2Own contest winners, and CVEs targeting exploitation of vulnerabilities in firmware running in these secondary processors. Bugs remotely exploitable over the air (eg. WiFi and cellular baseband bugs) are of particular concern and, therefore, are popular within the security research community. These types of bugs even have their own categorization in well known 3rd party exploit marketplaces.

Regardless of whether it is remote code execution within the WiFi SoC or within the cellular baseband, a common and resonating theme has been the consistent lack of exploit mitigations in firmware. Conveniently, Android has significant experience in enabling exploit mitigations across critical attack surfaces.

Applying years worth of lessons learned in systems hardening

Over the last few years, we have successfully enabled compiler-based mitigations in Android — on the AP — which add additional layers of defense across the platform, making it harder to build reproducible exploits and to prevent certain types of bugs from becoming vulnerabilities. Building on top of these successes and lessons learned, we’re applying the same principles to hardening the security of firmware that runs outside of Android per se, directly on the bare-metal hardware.

In particular, we are working with our ecosystem partners in several areas aimed at hardening the security of firmware that interacts with Android:

Bare-metal support

Compiler-based sanitizers have no runtime requirements in trapping mode, which provides a meaningful layer of protection we want: it causes the program to abort execution when detecting undefined behavior. As a result, memory corruption vulnerabilities that would otherwise be exploitable are now stopped entirely. To aid developers in testing, troubleshooting, and generating bug reports on debug builds, both minimal and full diagnostics modes can be enabled, which require defining and linking the requisite runtime handlers.

Most Control Flow Integrity (CFI) schemes also work for bare-metal targets in trapping mode. LLVM’s1 CFI across shared libraries scheme (cross-DSO) is the exception as it requires a runtime to be defined for the target. Shadow Call Stack, an AArch64-only feature, has a runtime component which initializes the shadow stack. LLVM does not provide this runtime for any target, so bare-metal users would need to define that runtime to use it.

The challenge

Enabling exploit mitigations in firmware running on bare metal targets is no easy feat. While the AP (Application Processor) hosts a powerful operating system (Linux) with comparatively abundant CPU and memory resources, bare metal targets are often severely resource-constrained, and are tuned to run a very specific set of functions. Any perturbation in compute and/or memory consumption introduced by enabling, for example, compiler-based sanitizers, could have a significant impact in functionality, performance, and stability.

Therefore, it is critical to optimize how and where exploit mitigations are turned on. The goal is to maximize impact — harden the most exposed attack surface — while minimizing any performance/stability impact. For example, in the case of the cellular baseband, we recommend focusing on code and libraries responsible for parsing messages delivered over the air (particularly for pre-authentication protocols such as RRC and NAS, which are the most exposed attack surface), libraries encoding/decoding complex formats (for example ASN.1), and libraries implementing IMS (IP Multimedia System) functionality, or parsing SMS and/or MMS.

Fuzzing and Vulnerability Rewards Program

Enabling exploit mitigations and compiler-based sanitizers are excellent techniques to minimize the chances of unknown bugs becoming exploitable. However, it is also important to continuously look for, find, and patch bugs.

Fuzzing continues to be a highly efficient method to find impactful bugs. It’s also been proven to be effective for signaling larger design issues in code. Our team partners closely with Android teams working on fuzzing and security assessments to leverage their expertise and tools with bare metal targets.

This collaboration also allowed us to scale fuzzing activities across Google by deploying central infrastructure that allows fuzzers to run in perpetuity. This is a high-value approach known as continuous fuzzing.

In parallel, we also accept and reward external contributions via our Vulnerability Rewards Program. Along with the launch of Android 13, we updated the severity guidelines to further highlight remotely exploitable bugs in connectivity firmware. We look forward to the contributions from the security research community to help us find and patch bugs in bare metal targets.

On the horizon

In Android 12 we announced support for Rust in the Android platform, and Android 13 is the first release with a majority of new code written in a memory safe language. We see a lot of potential in also leveraging memory-safe languages for bare metal targets, particularly for high risk and exposed attack surface.

Hardening firmware running on bare metal to materially increase the level of protection - across more surfaces in Android - is one of the priorities of Android Security. Moving forward, our goal is to expand the use of these mitigation technologies for more bare metal targets, and we strongly encourage our partners to do the same. We stand ready to assist our ecosystem partners to harden bare metal firmware.

Special thanks to our colleagues who contributed to this blog post and our firmware security hardening efforts: Diana Baker, Farzan Karimi, Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Kevin Deus, Eugene Rodionov, Pirama Arumuga Nainar, Sami Tolvanen, Stephen Hines, Xuan Xing, Yomna Nasser.

Notes


  1. LLVM - is a compiler framework used by multiple programming languages 

Should companies be responsible for cyberattacks? The U.S. government thinks so – and frankly, we agree.

Jen Easterly and Eric Goldstein of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at the Department of Homeland Security planted a flag in the sand:

“The incentives for developing and selling technology have eclipsed customer safety in importance. […] Americans…have unwittingly come to accept that it is normal for new software and devices to be indefensible by design. They accept products that are released to market with dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of defects. They accept that the cybersecurity burden falls disproportionately on consumers and small organizations, which are often least aware of the threat and least capable of protecting themselves.”

We think they’re right. It’s time for companies to step up on their own and work with governments to help fix a flawed ecosystem. Just look at the growing threat of ransomware, where bad actors lock up organizations’ systems and demand payment or ransom to restore access. Ransomware affects every industry, in every corner of the globe – and it thrives on pre-existing vulnerabilities: insecure software, indefensible architectures, and inadequate security investment.

Remember that sophisticated ransomware operators have bosses and budgets too. They increase their return on investment by exploiting outdated and insecure technology systems that are too hard to defend. Alarmingly, the most significant source of compromise is through exploitation of known vulnerabilities, holes sometimes left unpatched for years. While law enforcement works to bring ransomware operators to justice, this merely treats the symptoms of the problem.


Treating the root causes will require addressing the underlying sources of digital vulnerabilities. As Easterly and Goldstein rightly point out, “secure by default” and “secure by design” should be table stakes.

The bottom line: People deserve products that are secure by default and systems that are built to withstand the growing onslaught from attackers. Safety should be fundamental: built-in, enabled out of the box, and not added on as an afterthought. In other words, we need secure products, not security products. That’s why Google has worked to build security in – often making it invisible – to our users. Many of our most significant security features, including innovations like SafeBrowsing, do their best work behind the scenes for our core consumer products.

There’s come to be an unfortunate belief that security features are cumbersome and hurt user experience. That can be true – but it doesn’t need to be. We can make the safe path the easiest, most helpful path for people using our products. Our approach to multi-factor authentication – one of the most important controls to defend against phishing attacks – provides a great example. Since 2021, we’ve turned on 2-Step Verification (2SV) by default for hundreds of millions of people to add an additional layer of security across their online accounts. If we had simply announced 2SV as an available option for people to enroll in, it would have failed like so many other security add-ons. Instead, we pioneered an approach using in-app notifications that was so seamless and integrated, many of the millions of people we auto-enrolled never noticed they adopted 2SV. We’ve taken this approach even further by building the “second factor” right into phones – giving people the strongest form of account security as soon as they have their device.

As for secure by design: We all have to shift our focus from reactive incident response to upstream software development. That will demand a completely new approach to how companies build products and services. We’ve learned a lot in the past decade about reengineering security architectures, and actively apply those learnings to keep people safe online every day. Ensuring technology is secure by design should be like balancing budgets — a part of business as usual. However, it isn’t easy to cut-and-paste solutions here: developers need to think deeply about the threats their products will face, and design them from the ground up to withstand those attacks. And the same principles are true for securing the development process as they are for users: the secure engineering choice must also be the easiest and most helpful one.

Building security into every stage of the software development process takes work, but recent innovations, like our SLSA framework for secure software supply chains, and new general purpose memory-safe languages, are making it easier. Perhaps most significantly, adopting modern cloud architectures makes it easier to define and enforce secure software development policies.

Persistent collaboration between private and public sector partners is essential. No company can solve the cybersecurity challenge on its own. It’s a collective action problem that demands a collective solution, including international coordination and collaboration. Many public and private initiatives — threat sharing, incident response, law enforcement cooperation — are valuable, but address only symptoms, not root causes. We can do better than just holding attackers to account after the fact.

As Easterly and Goldstein write, “Americans need a new model, one they can trust to ensure the safety and integrity of the technology that they use every hour of every day.” Again, we agree, but in this case we’d take it a step further. Building this model and ensuring it can scale calls for close cooperation between tech companies, standards bodies, and government agencies. But since technologies and companies cross borders, we also need to take a global view: Cybersecurity is a team sport, and international coordination is essential to avoid conflicting requirements that unintentionally make it harder to secure software. Broad regulatory cooperation on cybersecurity will promote secure-by-default principles for everyone. This approach holds enormous promise, and not just for technologically advanced nations. Raising the security benchmark for basic consumer and enterprise technologies that all nations rely on offers far more bang for the buck. A far wider range of countries and companies can take these simple steps than can employ advanced cyber initiatives like detailed threat sharing and close operational collaboration. Given the interdependent nature of the ecosystem, we are only as strong as our weakest link. That means raising cyber standards globally will improve American resilience as well.

Of course, raising the security baseline won’t stop all bad actors, and software will likely always have flaws – but we can start by covering the basics, fixing the most egregious security risks, and coming up with new approaches that eliminate entire classes of threats. Google has made investments in the past two decades, but contributing resources is just a piece of the puzzle. It's work for all of us, but it's the responsible thing to do: The safety and security of our increasingly digitized world depends on it.

Since launching in 2016, Google's free OSS-Fuzz code testing service has helped get over 8800 vulnerabilities and 28,000 bugs fixed across 850 projects. Today, we’re happy to announce an expansion of our OSS-Fuzz Rewards Program, plus new features in OSS-Fuzz and our involvement in supporting academic fuzzing research.

Refreshed OSS-Fuzz rewards

The OSS-Fuzz project's purpose is to support the open source community in adopting fuzz testing, or fuzzing — an automated code testing technique for uncovering bugs in software. In addition to the OSS-Fuzz service, which provides a free platform for continuous fuzzing to critical open source projects, we established an OSS-Fuzz Reward Program in 2017 as part of our wider Patch Rewards Program.

We’ve operated this successfully for the past 5 years, and to date, the OSS-Fuzz Reward Program has awarded over $600,000 to over 65 different contributors for their help integrating new projects into OSS-Fuzz.

Today, we’re excited to announce that we’ve expanded the scope of the OSS-Fuzz Reward Program considerably, introducing many new types of rewards!

These new reward types cover contributions such as:

  • Project fuzzing coverage increases
  • Notable FuzzBench fuzzer integrations
  • Integrating a new sanitizer (example) that finds two new vulnerabilities

These changes boost the total rewards possible per project integration from a maximum of $20,000 to $30,000 (depending on the criticality of the project). In addition, we’ve also established two new reward categories that reward wider improvements across all OSS-Fuzz projects, with up to $11,337 available per category.

For more details, see the fully updated rules for our dedicated OSS-Fuzz Reward Program.

OSS-Fuzz improvements

We’ve continuously made improvements to OSS-Fuzz’s infrastructure over the years and expanded our language offerings to cover C/C++, Go, Rust, Java, Python, and Swift, and have introduced support for new frameworks such as FuzzTest. Additionally, as part of an ongoing collaboration with Code Intelligence, we’ll soon have support for JavaScript fuzzing through Jazzer.js.

FuzzIntrospector support

Last year, we launched the OpenSSF FuzzIntrospector tool and integrated it into OSS-Fuzz.

We’ve continued to build on this by adding new language support and better analysis, and now C/C++, Python, and Java projects integrated into OSS-Fuzz have detailed insights on how the coverage and fuzzing effectiveness for a project can be improved.

The FuzzIntrospector tool provides these insights by identifying complex code blocks that are blocked during fuzzing at runtime, as well as suggesting new fuzz targets that can be added. We’ve seen users successfully use this tool to improve the coverage of jsonnet, file, xpdf and bzip2, among others.

Anyone can use this tool to increase the coverage of a project and in turn be rewarded as part of the refreshed OSS-Fuzz rewards. See the full list of all OSS-Fuzz FuzzIntrospector reports to get started.

Fuzzing research and competition

The OSS-Fuzz team maintains FuzzBench, a service that enables security researchers in academia to test fuzzing improvements against real-world open source projects. Approaching its third anniversary in serving free benchmarking, FuzzBench is cited by over 100 papers and has been used as a platform for academic fuzzing workshops such as NDSS’22.

This year, FuzzBench has been invited to participate in the SBFT'23 workshop in ICSE, a premier research conference in the field, which for the first time is hosting a fuzzing competition. During this competition, the FuzzBench platform will be used to evaluate state-of-the-art fuzzers submitted by researchers from around the globe on both code coverage and bug-finding metrics.

Get involved!

We believe these initiatives will help scale security testing efforts across the broader open source ecosystem. We hope to accelerate the integration of critical open source projects into OSS-Fuzz by providing stronger incentives to security researchers and open source maintainers. Combined with our involvement in fuzzing research, these efforts are making OSS-Fuzz an even more powerful tool, enabling users to find more bugs, and, more critically, find them before the bad guys do!